The Unbounded Home, Property Values beyond Property Lines by Fennell, Lee Anne
University of Chicago Law School
Chicago Unbound
Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and
Economics Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics
2009
The Unbounded Home, Property Values beyond
Property Lines
Lee Anne Fennell
Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/law_and_economics
Part of the Law Commons
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics at Chicago Unbound. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and Economics by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more
information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.
Recommended Citation
Lee Anne Fennell, "The Unbounded Home, Property Values beyond Property Lines" ( John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics
Working Paper No. 481, 2009).
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1459515
THE 
UNBOUNDED 
HOME
PROPERTY VALUES 
BEYOND PROPERTY LINES
Lee Anne Fennell
Yale University Press
New Haven & London
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1459515
Published with assistance from the Louis Stern 
Memorial Fund.
Copyright © 2009 by Lee Anne Fennell. All rights reserved.
This book may not be reproduced, in whole or in part, in-
cluding illustrations, in any form (beyond that copying per-
mitted by Sections 107 and 108 of the U.S. Copyright Law
and except by reviewers for the public press), without written
permission from the publishers.
Printed in the United States of America.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Fennell, Lee Anne.
The unbounded home : property values beyond property
lines / Lee Anne Fennell. 
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-300-12244-2 (pbk. : alk. paper)  1. Land
use—Law and legislation.  2. Right of property.  3. Com-
mons.  4. Homeowners’ associations—Law and legislation.
5. Home—Philosophy.  I. Title.
K3534.F46  2009
343.73025—dc22 2008054894
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British
Library.
This paper meets the requirements of ANSI/NISO Z39.48–
1992 (Permanence of Paper). 
1 0  9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1459515
CONTENTS
Acknowledgments   ix
Introduction   1
PART I. PROPERTY OUT OF BOUNDS
1. Beyond Exclusion   9
2. Constructing the Home   25
3. The Commons and the Anticommons   45
PART II. SPILLOVERS WITHIN NEIGHBORHOODS
4. Managing the Neighborhood Commons   67
5. Adaptive Options   96
PART III. COMMUNITY COMPOSITION
6. Association and Exclusion   123
7. Property in Association   147
PART IV. RECONFIGURING HOMEOWNERSHIP
8. Breaking Up the Bundle   173
9. Homeownership, Version 2.0   197
Conclusion   219
Notes   223
Bibliography   263
Index   291
What does property mean, here and now, in the early twenty-
first-century United States? This book approaches the question by ex-
amining a set of problems surrounding our society’s most familiar,
important, and emotionally freighted manifestation of property—the
home. That the home has evolved as a resource over the past two cen-
turies should not surprise even the most casual observer of social history.
In 1790, just over 5 percent of the U.S. population lived in urban areas;
by 2000, the figure was 79 percent, and more than 80 percent of the
population resided within metropolitan areas.1 Homeownership rates
have also grown significantly; about two thirds of metropolitan area
householders are now homeowners.2 The residential experience for most
Americans thus uneasily combines the profound interdependence of met-
ropolitan life with the promise of unbridled autonomy that homeown-
ership connotes.
Property law has done surprisingly little to respond to these transfor-
mations in residential life or to address the resulting tension. Although
land use controls attempt to counteract the spillovers that interdepen -
dence produces, they tend to operate in a blunt and categorical manner
that introduces new difficulties. Meanwhile, our notion of home as a form
of property remains mired in outdated concepts, dominated by fencelines
and surveys, metes and bounds. My project here is to expose the increas-
ingly poor fit between widespread property concepts and the home as it
exists today, to isolate the problems caused by that divergence, and to sug-
gest some ways of addressing it.
1
INTRODUCTION
This book’s analysis proceeds from a single, simple premise: the value of
residential property in metropolitan areas has come unbound from the four
corners of the owned parcel. As the realtor’s mantra of “location, location,
location” suggests, homebuyers are often much less interested in the on-site
attributes of real estate than in the people, things, services, and conditions
lying beyond what we continue to refer to as the property’s boundaries. Res-
idential property now serves not only as a resource in its own right but also
as a placeholder for a quite different set of resources that are not, and can-
not be, contained within the physical edges delineated by plat surveys. Yet,
law and theory continue to apply boundary-focused templates to homes that
bear a greater conceptual resemblance to Bluetooth than to Blackacre. This
book uses a series of problems central to residential life in the United States
to spotlight this disconnect and to consider what it would mean for law and
policy to take seriously the increasingly diffuse nature of residential prop-
erty’s value.
To fix ideas, consider how property concepts surrounding the home might
enter the consciousness of a fictitious household, the Middletons, over the
course of a single month. The Middletons fret about a pending proposal to
redraw elementary school attendance zones (even though their youngest is
now in middle school). They speak out at a zoning meeting to oppose the
introduction of townhouses in an area three blocks from their home that is
currently zoned for single-family homes. They remark with approval on a
news article about the planned condemnation of a “blighted” block eight
miles from their home, to make way for a development that would offer
convenient shopping. They are appalled by an inquiry from city officials
about whether Maggie Middleton, who designs Web sites for dozens of
clients and advertises her services in the yellow pages, is operating an unli-
censed home business. They continue their long-standing dispute with their
homeowners association about whether they can park their boat trailer in
the driveway. And they register a complaint with the city authorities about
their next-door neighbors, who seem to have rented out their basement to
another family in violation of zoning law. And so on.
Socialized to view the home as a castle, the Middletons think it only nat-
ural that they should control what happens on their own property.3 As a re-
sult, they vehemently resist any intrusion into their ownership prerogatives.
But, like most Americans, the Middletons have another reason to be hyper-
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vigilant about their home: it represents the household’s single largest asset,
aside from human capital. For this reason, they feel fully justified in oppos-
ing activities beyond their parcel’s borders that might devalue their most sig-
nificant source of financial security.4 What we have, then, is a nation of
homeowners, largely concentrated in metropolitan areas, who act both as
castle-keepers bent on controlling their own space and as community cru-
saders bent on controlling everyone else’s. It would be easy to fault the Mid-
dletons for being inconsistent, but the real culprit lies in a popular notion of
property that fails to square homeownership’s promise of dominion and con-
trol with the realities of a complex, interdependent world.
Of course, spillovers that affect neighboring properties are nothing new,
and law has long possessed tools for addressing them. But when enough of
the value of a resource is found beyond the edges of the site we call “the
property,” we must ask whether we are looking in the right place when con-
templating the resource. The question is not one of mere theoretical inter-
est. I contend that the blunt mechanisms that have been used to deflect
negative spillovers and to capture positive spillovers are not designed to bear
the weight placed upon them by the outward shift in residential property’s
center of gravity. As a result, efforts to address overwhelming and pervasive
off-site influences have created new dilemmas of their own.
Two overlapping sets of homebuyer concerns produce especially chal-
lenging interactions among neighbors, developers, and municipalities: neigh-
borhood ambience and community composition. The strategic dilemmas
that surround these issues reveal a central fact about property’s unbounded
nature: the physical exclusion of outsiders from individually owned parcels
is a dramatically underprotective strategy for securing access to the resources
that people mean to purchase when they buy a home. Unable to physically
fence out unwanted impacts or fence in desired amenities, households col-
lectively turn to property mechanisms like zoning and covenants to push
control outward from the individual parcel. These mechanisms typically rely
on categorical bans on particular land uses within a given neighborhood,
zone, or jurisdiction.
The impulse to apply blunt principles of exclusion to a realm that extends
beyond the individual parcel is comprehensible, but ultimately problematic.
First, there is an obvious tension between the desire, grounded in traditional
notions of property, to exercise dominion over one’s own parcel and the de-
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sire, prompted by the realities of modern life, to control every aspect of the
environment surrounding one’s parcel. The result has been confusion about
what property ownership means, and equal measures of outrage against in-
trusions on one’s prerogatives as an owner and as an interested neighbor.
Second, even if individual communities can reach internal agreement about
excluding particular land uses from their midst, the overall pattern of land use
choices within a larger metropolitan area can create additional negative ef-
fects. Because excluding land uses (such as multifamily homes) often
amounts to excluding households (those who cannot afford single-family
homes), associational patterns in metropolitan areas are deeply impacted by
the use of these property tools.
This book considers how society might design alternatives to existing prop-
erty instruments that would address both localized extraparcel impacts and
the larger-scale dilemmas produced by efforts to control those localized im-
pacts. In broad terms, these alternatives involve reconfiguring property so
that it does a better job of aligning the homeowner’s returns with the home-
owner’s choices. These reconfigurations require us to move beyond the bi-
nary choices that have dominated the metropolitan residential experience
—banning or permitting uses, allowing or forbidding exclusion, renting or
owning a home. Conceiving conflicts like those faced by the Middletons as
resource dilemmas not entirely unlike those surrounding resources like clean
air or a sustainable fishery allows us to expand the menu of policy options.
One reconfiguration approach involves developing new forms of alien-
able entitlements, rather than simply banning or allowing a particular activ-
ity. Drawing on innovations in environmental law, we can imagine devising
tradable entitlements to engage in acts with aesthetic impacts, and even (in
carefully delineated contexts) tradable entitlements relating to association
with preferred neighbors and peers. These instruments would allow re-
sponsibility for inputs into common environments to be more precisely al-
located and priced. Another, quite different, approach would attenuate
homeowners’ vulnerability to off-site impacts by scaling back their invest-
ment exposure so that it more closely aligns with their effective sphere of
control. Here, building on an exciting line of work by Robert Shiller and
his collaborators (among others), I examine the potential to reconfigure
homeownership in a way that decouples the investment volatility associated
with off-site factors from the homeowner’s bundle.5
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The analysis proceeds in four parts. Part I lays out the theoretical frame-
work that will be employed throughout the balance of the book, working
through and building on a set of concepts familiar to many academic read-
ers—property rules and liability rules, competing models of property, the
Tiebout Hypothesis, the tragedies of the commons and anticommons, and
the strategic interactions captured in games like the Prisoner’s Dilemma and
Chicken. Part II examines problems of neighborhood aesthetics, assesses cur-
rent attempts to address those problems, and proposes a new approach in-
volving transferable entitlements in aesthetic impacts. Part III takes on the
most ambitious and controversial implications of recasting residential prop-
erty to account for off-site impacts. Here, I suggest that residential associa-
tion itself constitutes a resource dilemma that can, in certain cases, benefit
from the theoretical tools of property. Part IV steps back to consider whether
some of the theoretical and practical problems surveyed in the book could be
alleviated through a more fundamental alteration of the types of investment
volatility included in the homeownership bundle.
While the book focuses on the home’s theoretical place within the me-
tropolis, my analytic method serves more generally to illustrate the interac-
tion of collective action problems at different geographic scales. The
commons, anticommons, and semicommons templates that I apply here to
the metropolitan neighborhood context are general-purpose analytic tools
that can be used to understand and respond to all manner of resource dilem-
mas. The unbounded home thus represents not only an especially pressing
and important set of unresolved collective action problems but also a window
into larger questions of property theory.
Before I continue, two stylistic matters bear mentioning. First, I follow the
convention of using female and male pronouns, respectively, in alternating
chapters. Second, the documentation style used in this book is much sparer
than that which prevails in the law reviews. I employ endnotes rather than
footnotes and, to avoid breaking the flow of the text, typically affix them to
the ends of sentences or groups of sentences rather than tag them onto each
individual proposition. The endnotes contain short-form citations to some of
the most relevant sources as well as some explanatory notes; full citations ap-
pear in the bibliography. Readers desiring more background material may
find the articles on which this book draws, which are listed in the Acknowl-
edgments, to be useful sources of additional citations.
INTRODUCTION 5
BEYOND EXCLUSION
9
1
The institution of homeownership, despite its familiarity, pro-
duces conflicting and even incoherent attitudes. People are shocked to
learn that acts like building a fence or painting a door can be prohibited
on their own property, but they are equally appalled at the prospect of
a high-density development down the block. They are terrified that their
beloved home might be taken through eminent domain, yet they are
aghast if the city allows local conditions to erode their property values.
Homeowners want an ironclad sphere of privacy and autonomy, but
they want it wrapped in an environment that they can control in every
particular. They want a secure and lucrative investment vehicle that dou-
bles as an inviolable repository for subjective value. In short, people try
to wring a great deal more from their homes than any property system
can deliver.
How should law respond to these incongruous demands on residential
property? The fact that people want inconsistent things from their homes
need not be interpreted as a sign of entrenched mental confusion or short-
sighted selfishness. Property theory has offered people no coherent vision
of what it means to own a home that might be reconciled in even a loose
way with lived experience. Homeowners have been given no tools for per-
ceiving—much less making—the relevant trade-offs between individual
and collective control. Rather, they oscillate in an unreflective way be-
tween asserting individual control over their own parcels and protecting
their stakes in off-site occurrences.
Resolving this tension requires more than merely bringing people’s
thinking about property up to date or increasing the sophistication with
which they view the institution of homeownership. People already un-
derstand that the home’s value comprises more than the parcel contains.
Rather, the poor fit of existing property models corresponds to sub-
stantive shortcomings in property law. Land use controls, as they exist
today, operate mainly in a binary manner—either a use is banned, or it
is allowed. There is almost never the openly acknowledged possibility
that households could pay for the privilege of engaging in an unusual
but especially valued use, such as adding a garage apartment, or that gov-
erning bodies could be required to pay for the privilege of banning a
particular land use, such as multifamily dwellings. Moreover, few have
thought creatively about the set of risks that the standard homeowner-
ship bundle should and should not contain as a default matter. For ex-
ample, must homeowners be exposed to housing market risks that they
have no power to control, or might these risks be more efficiently held
by investors within diversified portfolios?1 By failing to probe such ques-
tions, property law has developed without a coherent understanding of
the home as a resource.
In this book, I hope to advance a new understanding of residential prop-
erty. In doing so, I chart the relevant trade-offs between household and
community control and propose mechanisms to assist people and com-
munities in making them. This task requires first stepping back to rethink
the meaning of property. Above all, property represents a societal response
to resource dilemmas. But property is also an inherently sticky institution
that carries forward the forms and shapes that worked best in resolving
resource dilemmas in the past. The adaptation of old property forms to
new conditions presents familiar difficulties for property theory. Should
we update property incrementally, expand it to include more legal inter-
ests, hold firm to our past understanding of it, or simply declare it dead as
a distinct idea?2 Here, I approach property from a functional perspective
by asking what property is meant to do.
In the balance of the chapter, I consider the function of property in a
quite general way. This discussion sets the stage for the next chapter, in
which I examine the special characteristics of the home as a resource.
Chapter 3 will then introduce the commons and anticommons templates
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that are used throughout the book to understand and devise solutions to
a broad range of residential property dilemmas.
Property’s Work
Writing more than two hundred and forty years ago (and using a
fair degree of hyperbole even then), William Blackstone articulated an ideal
of property as “that sole and despotic dominion that one man claims and
exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the
right of any other individual in the universe.”3 Legal thinkers have always
recognized that property as it actually exists does not square with this
model. Indeed, Blackstone himself did not endorse such an absolute view
of property, as his writings make clear.4 But idealized visions of dominion
and exclusion live on in the popular imagination as representing the true
core of property.5 This model has worked less and less well as the spectrum
of privileges conveyed by property ownership has narrowed and the per-
centage of value represented by factors lying outside the subject parcel has
grown. Yet, no satisfactory model has emerged to replace it.
To be sure, many legal scholars (from the legal realists onward) have
gravitated toward the metaphor of property as a “bundle of rights” or
“bundle of sticks.”6 This approach has the advantage of permitting prop-
erty to mean as much or as little as the situation requires—“sticks” can be
added, subtracted, combined, and recombined in limitless ways, all with-
out ever moving outside the category of property. But this theoretical
strength is also a weakness. The sticks idea suggests that property lacks
any stable core of meaning around which expectations might form; as
such, it cannot help laypeople reconcile the shortcomings of the exclu-
sion-based model. While the notion of a bundle of sticks may be helpful
in understanding that property rights can be diminished without being
extinguished, it is of little help in understanding why or how this diminu-
tion might occur.
Consider a simple dispute between Angus, who wishes to add a “granny
flat” to his home to generate rental income,7 and his neighbor, Beth, who
strongly opposes this use. Angus might argue that what happens on his
property is subject to his own personal dominion and is simply none of
Beth’s business. This argument, of course, proves too much. Even at com-
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mon law, Angus could not defend his maintenance of a nuisance on his
property using this logic. Beth, for her part, might invoke her own idea
of exclusion by asserting that her dominion over her own property is
compromised by the presence of granny flats within her viewshed. Ab-
stract principles of exclusion on their own offer no way of choosing be-
tween Angus’s position and Beth’s. The bundle-of-sticks approach
provides no determinacy either, as it would simply lead Angus and Beth
to wrangle over who should be allotted the granny-flat stick associated
with Angus’s property.
Neither the bundle-of-sticks metaphor nor the model of Blackstonian
exclusion offers useful normative guidance in resolving land use disputes,
because neither approach focuses on the appropriate function of property.
One might say that property is meant to exclude. But exclusion is pointless
on its own; it only becomes valuable when it enables property owners to do
something—or some set of things. Modern advocates of an exclusion-based
understanding of property indeed emphasize that exclusion is instrumen-
tal to performing any of a broad and indeterminate set of uses on one’s
land.8 Moreover, these scholars suggest that exclusion is an attractive core
approach to property precisely because it can be enforced without any in-
quiry into the specific uses that might be made of the owner’s exclusive
realm.9 On this account, property’s job is to clear a space where diverse en-
deavors can be undertaken by an owner without interference.
By pushing a bit on this idea, we can see both the ways in which ex-
clusion operates as advertised and the ways in which it falls short. Exclu-
sion’s advantage lies in its ability to strengthen the relationship between
an owner’s inputs and the outcomes that she enjoys or suffers. The idea
is intuitive. Keeping others off the property safeguards one’s own inputs
(for example, by keeping carefully distributed fertilizer from being dis-
placed) while keeping out extraneous and potentially harmful inputs (such
as crop-damaging cows). Exclusion also protects positive outcomes from
being carried away—outsiders cannot simply show up and fill their knap-
sacks with ears of corn that have been painstakingly cultivated over a se-
ries of months. More generally, exclusion is a broad-gauge strategy for
protecting from interference whatever (unknown and perhaps unknow-
able) activities may be going on inside the property boundaries.10 A cul-
ture of exclusion-based property ownership also encourages owners to
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fence in factors (such as unruly dogs) that might produce unwanted im-
pacts for neighbors.
Intuitive as a boundary-focused approach seems when discussing crops
and animals, it appears somewhat anachronistic when applied to homes.
Although boundaries remain unquestionably important (especially for pro-
tecting interior space), fortifying and defending the parcel’s boundaries is
both an underinclusive and an overinclusive strategy for securing the
home’s value. Today, most of the threats to the value of one’s home come
not from marauding cattle or vegetable thieves, but rather from events
and conditions that lie outside the parcel’s boundaries and never cross
those boundaries in a physical sense. Larger economic and social factors
determine the demand for, and supply of, housing in a particular location.
For example, changes in local labor markets can influence both the costs
of home construction and the demand for housing. Local governmental
decisions about matters like transportation, land use, education, and polic-
ing can have dramatic effects on the home’s value. The aggregate actions
of one’s neighbors also produce effects without manifesting themselves in
physical intrusions. For such reasons, a homeowner’s defense of her
boundaries is a radically underinclusive strategy for protecting and en-
hancing the value of her property.
Boundary exclusion is also an overinclusive strategy for safeguarding
home values. While homeowners may be quite vigilant about exclusion
when it comes to the dwelling itself and its private fenced areas, strong ex-
clusion from the parcel’s edges would be unworkable, even ludicrous. For
example, only the most curmudgeonly homeowner would try to keep neigh-
borhood children from making reasonable use of the front lawn to retrieve
wayward toys or pets. Pedestrians are typically allowed to use the edges of
front yards as walkways in areas lacking sidewalks, especially where traffic
makes walking in the roadway unsafe. Likewise, homeowners routinely allow
motorists to use their driveways to execute K-turns; they also allow uninvited
individuals to approach the front door under most circumstances.11 And al-
though one’s ownership interest rises “to the sky,” airplanes, satellites, and
spacecraft are legally allowed to enter one’s airspace.12
In addition to such obvious physical invasions, innumerable lesser
boundary crossings occur at the molecular level. Fumes, odors, sound,
and light cross freely over property boundaries. Even if banning all activ-
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ities producing such cross-boundary impacts were possible, it would not
be desirable—at least if we understand exclusion not as an end in itself but
rather as a means to the end of safeguarding meaningful land uses. Be-
cause virtually any activity on one’s property will generate some extra-
boundary effects, such a rule would render property worthless as a
practical matter. For example, simply walking across one’s own front yard
stirs air molecules and doubtless causes some of them to cross the bound-
ary line. Nor can we assume that these moving molecules will have no im-
pact on a neighbor’s enterprises. For all we know, the neighbor is engaged
in a sensitive weather experiment that will be grievously disrupted by even
the slightest stirring of air across the boundaries.13
The point is a simple one: some degree of exclusion helps property do its
job of pairing inputs and outputs, but too much exclusion can be harmful
to property’s ultimate ends. As exclusion rights become more and more cat-
egorical, they erode some of the use-content that exclusion was meant to
protect in the first place.14 Hence, property law cannot simply adopt a rigid,
categorical rule of exclusion but rather must decide on the strength and con-
tent of exclusion rights. Moreover, exclusion is not sufficient to deliver all of
the protection that homeowners seek. Thus, the law must also decide what
else it will do—or allow homeowners acting collectively to do—to influence
events and conditions occurring outside individually owned parcels.
Traditionally, law has responded to the shortcomings of boundaries by
deciding whether to permit various activities with extraboundary impacts
or to prohibit them outright. As greater numbers of people live and work
in close proximity and as activities with extraboundary impacts prolifer-
ate, so too does the number of required societal judgments about those ac-
tivities. The bundle-of-sticks metaphor initially seems well suited to handle
these adjustments. Disaggregating property into separate sticks repre-
senting different uses or different powers suggests that we can decide in
an endlessly precise and customized manner what property should mean
in any given instance. As legal theorists have noted, however, this decom-
position threatens to destroy property as a distinct subfield of legal enti-
tlements.15 Because the sticks metaphor is not tethered to a functional
understanding of property, it contains no stopping point in breaking down
familiar property forms and, as noted above, cannot provide any guidance
in deciding how the various sticks should be distributed among owners.
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I argue that property’s essential nature resides in the institution’s ca-
pacity to pool together inputs and outputs. It need not do so perfectly, of
course. Routine spillovers across boundaries can be identified and readily
controlled through standard legal instruments: regulation, tort law, con-
tractual arrangements, or special-purpose property instruments like ease-
ments. But as the volume and proportion of extraboundary effects arising
from activities undertaken on property grows, the property form itself (as
it is currently conceived) becomes increasingly incapable of collecting to-
gether inputs and outputs and charging them to the account of the owner.
The bundle-of-rights model never registers this problem—the bundle is
simply split into ever more sticks. On a functional account, however, per-
vasive and uncontrollable off-site effects signal a fundamental failure in
property’s configuration.
A Leaky Bucket of Gambles
A functional look at property suggests that a new metaphor is in
order, one that focuses on property’s job of pairing together inputs and
their (often quite uncertain) effects or outcomes. Taking a page from
Henry Smith, who recently adopted an image William Markby employed
more than a century ago, I suggest that a bucket offers the best working
model of property.16 Smith finds Markby’s “bucket of water” metaphor
compelling because it suggests that property is made up not of distinct,
well-articulated sticks but rather of a unified and undifferentiated whole
representing all the things that one might do with one’s property.17 I find
the metaphor fitting for a second reason—buckets are not pristine, air-
tight containers but rather rough-and-ready catchments that are notori-
ously prone to leaks and sloshes.
Property, true to its bucketlike form, can at best capture most of the
outcomes associated with an owner’s inputs most of the time. Meanwhile,
other sources of law (tort, regulation, and so on) stand ready to clean up
routine spills and sloshes. When the sloshes start to overwhelm the system
so that more is spilling out than is staying in, however, it is time to re-
configure the bucket—whether by making it larger, nesting it within other
buckets, or devising special-purpose beakers and pails that can address
identifiable sources of spillage. In later chapters, I suggest in a more con-
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crete way how these possibilities might play out. For now, it is worth tak-
ing a moment to flesh out the metaphor.
What, exactly, is collected in the bucket? On one view, the bucket arrives
prefilled with all the conceivable things that an owner might do with the
property. The owner can then selectively dip out and transfer specific uses
to others, or see particular use privileges siphoned away politically.18 While
this way of thinking about the bucket vividly suggests that the initial set of
use privileges represents an undifferentiated whole rather than discrete, enu-
merated entitlement sticks that have been stacked together, it does no bet-
ter than the sticks analogy in offering intuitions about when subsets of the
overall entitlement should be shifted to another party, or indeed about how
large the bucket should be and what its contents should originally include.
A better way of understanding the bucket’s contents follows from a
functional understanding of property. On this view, the bucket itself rep-
resents the conceptual boundaries of a particular property form, which is
ideally capable of holding and amassing value for an owner over time. The
owner puts content into the bucket by engaging in any of a wide variety
of endeavors on or with the property; these endeavors will involve inputs
of materials, time, effort, and skill. The associated choices represent gam-
bles that will play out within the domain of the owner’s holding.19 The in-
stitution of property aspires to pair together, with some regularity, control
over inputs and ownership of outcomes.
Of course, owners are not free to plunk all kinds of inputs into their
property buckets willy-nilly. The law rules out some activities because they
run afoul of normative constraints on action quite independent of prop-
erty law (for example, murder is prohibited, even if an individual owns the
place in which the murder would occur and the weapon for carrying it
out).20 In other cases, law places constraints on what can be done with the
property even though the activity in question carries social value, because
of its tendency to produce harmful side effects. But property allows own-
ers significant choice among inputs on the expectation that the results will
be charged back against that same owner.
This picture of property suggests that the bucket (that is, the concep-
tual boundaries of the property) should be scaled in a manner that renders
it generally capable of containing the outcomes, whether positive or neg-
ative, of the gambles that are typically undertaken by the person desig-
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nated as owner. The task of appropriately scaling property is a dynamic
one; changes in the way that owners use property may yield outcomes that
are captured less well (or more well) by existing property forms. For ex-
ample, in times and places where owners commonly used property for agri-
culture with only incidental residential uses, the recreational music-making
of one family was unlikely to disturb a neighbor’s activities. As property
holdings grew smaller, residences became more tightly spaced, and tech-
nologies for amplifying music became available, the inputs into the en-
deavor of merrymaking in one’s home became increasingly likely to yield
outcomes that would interfere with the endeavors undertaken by neigh-
boring property owners. In short, the scale of the activities that owners un-
dertake on their property may fall out of alignment with the scale of the
outcomes of those activities.21
What should the law do about inputs that have a demonstrated or sus-
pected tendency to generate negative effects beyond the property’s bound-
aries? There are many possible responses—some that are well recognized
and others that have not been as carefully explored.
Four Rules
A standard starting point for analyzing society’s slate of choices for
resolving land use conflicts is found in Guido Calabresi and Douglas
Melamed’s groundbreaking 1972 Harvard Law Review article.22 Calabresi
and Melamed offer a systematic look at the alternatives available to a court
adjudicating a conflict between two neighboring parties, such as a factory
spewing smoke and a homeowner suffering nearby. Their framework broke
the court’s choice into two parts: which party holds the entitlement at
issue (here, over what happens to the air shared by the factory and the
homeowner) and how that entitlement is protected by the law. 
As Ronald Coase emphasizes, it takes two parties to create a land use
conflict.23 The law must therefore choose which party’s interests will re-
ceive priority.  In a world of zero transaction costs, the Coase Theorem
holds, the parties could bargain their way to an efficient solution regard-
less of the initial legal rule (although they might not reach the same solu-
tion from every starting point).24 But because transaction costs are often
significant, the law’s choice about whom to entitle can matter a great deal.
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Once that decision has been made, a second decision becomes necessary—
how the entitlement will be protected. Calabresi and Melamed distinguish
between two alternative protection regimes—property rules and liability
rules. What they term “property rule” protection is exemplified by the sorts
of injunctive relief typically available to property owners to prevent tres-
passes, although it would also encompass other, supercompensatory forms
of relief, such as punitive damages. In contrast, “liability rule” protection,
which provides only for compensatory damages, effectively sets a price at
which an entitlement belonging to one party may be unilaterally obtained
by another party without the original entitlement-holder’s consent. Com-
bining the choice of initial entitlement assignment with the choice of enti-
tlement protection yields a two-by-two grid, as shown in Table 1-1.25
Rules 1 and 3 represent the opposite poles of categorically allowing or
prohibiting the factory’s operations.  In each case, the party disfavored by
the legal rule would be stuck with it unless she could successfully negoti-
ate a change with the other party (that is, a move from a regime in which
the factory’s operations were prohibited to one in which they were per-
mitted, or vice versa). Rules 2 and 4 introduce the possibility that one
party might begin with the right to control what happens to the air, but
the other would be able to buy up that right unilaterally, over any objec-
tions of the original entitlement holder, at a price set by a third party. That
the court’s choice set included not three possibilities but four was an im-
portant insight of the piece. Not only could the court (by setting damages)
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Table 1-1 Calabresi and Melamed’s four rules
Protected by a property
rule
Protected by a liability 
rule
Homeowner holds 
entitlement
Factory is enjoined 
(Rule 1)
Factory can pollute and
pay damages (Rule 2)
Factory holds entitlement
No relief  (Rule 3)
Homeowner can stop pol-
lution by paying stopping
costs (Rule 4)
effectively establish a price at which the factory could emit over the ob-
jections of the homeowner, the court could also establish a price at which
the homeowner could shut down the factory’s operations over the factory’s
objections.26 As it happened, this unusual fourth alternative was inde-
pendently approximated in a case decided by the Arizona Supreme Court
around the time that Calabresi and Melamed published their article.27
Although Calabresi and Melamed’s four-rule grid has not gone uncrit-
icized, it has served as a crucial catalyst in thinking broadly and creatively
about the many possible ways society might structure legal rules. Numer-
ous scholars have used the Calabresi and Melamed framework as a spring-
board for exploring additional applications of the four rules originally
outlined, as well as for adding new combinations and permutations to the
choice list.28 Taken in combination with the insights of Coase, the Cal-
abresi and Melamed framework leads to two observations that are foun-
dational to the analysis here. First, at least where normative side constraints
do not rule out the possibility, the law’s initial assignment of entitlements
need not be the final assignment—instead, entitlements can be transferred
between parties. Second, the law can choose how to structure those trans-
fers. Thus, not only can entitlements be designed to permit movement
from a given legal starting point upon mutual consent, they can also be
formulated to give one party or the other the option of making a unilat-
eral shift to a different legal regime at a particular price.
Scholarship building on the work of Calabresi and Melamed offers ad-
ditional insights into the many ways that control over conflicting land uses
might be structured.29 For purposes of the arguments in this book, one re-
finement is especially significant. In discussing pricing mechanisms in land
use contexts, we can distinguish the pricing of inputs that generate a risk
of harm from the assignment of liability for harmful outcomes.30 The next
section explains.
Inputs and Outcomes
Suppose Edison runs over Ferris’s foot with his Land Rover. A
court puts a dollar figure on the costs of the foot damage and makes Edi-
son pay that amount to Ferris. On the popular scholarly understanding,
this is a classic example of a liability rule in action, one in which Edison has
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“bought out” Ferris’s entitlement not to have his foot crushed by paying
for the damage caused. For many, this account grates against moral sensi-
bilities.31 Beyond that, it is simply an odd way to describe what has hap-
pened. As Carol Rose has noted, participants in an accident are thrust into
an interaction that was neither desired nor contemplated in advance, mak-
ing it inapt to suggest, as the scholarly literature does, that the injurer has
engaged in a purchase transaction or exercised an “option.”32 Normally,
when one buys something, one learns the price in advance and makes a
conscious decision to enter into the purchase transaction. Edison, the in-
jurer in our story, did neither of these things; instead, he merely selected
an input (the activity of driving at a particular level of inattentiveness) that
triggered his liability for any resulting harmful outcome.
Entitlement transfer mechanisms may involve liability payments trig-
gered by accidental outcomes (such as a crushed foot), or may instead in-
volve pricing inputs that create a risk of unwanted results (such as driving
in a certain manner). While advance input-based payments to potential
victims are hard to imagine in the accident context, they are much more
plausible in land use settings. Land use conflicts do not present one-off
chance encounters among strangers; they produce ongoing interactions
among neighbors. The explicit pricing of privileges to undertake particu-
lar endeavors on land (such as keeping pets or making particular aesthetic
choices) therefore forms a viable alternative to an outright ban on the ac-
tivity or a rule allocating liability for harmful outcomes.
Pricing inputs has some underappreciated advantages. First, because the
price term is not tied to the actual manifestation of harm, it can be con-
sciously adjusted to meet distributive or other goals.  The amount might
be set equal to an objective projection of the expected harm, but it might
also be keyed to the subjective value placed on the exercise (or nonexercise)
of the input by one party or the other. The explicit pricing of an entitlement
to engage in an otherwise legitimate input activity also avoids the implica-
tion (commonplace where liability for actual harm is characterized as a mere
“price”) that a party is buying the right to harm another person. Instead,
input pricing makes clear that the payment is being made only for the priv-
ilege of engaging in the legitimate activity itself.
Another closely related point involves incentives for the “victim” in
the interaction. Suppose Jack pays Jill a lump sum in advance for the en-
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titlement to throw boulders down his hill toward Jill’s property. If the
rolling boulders create a risk of harm for Jill, she has no less incentive
than she did before the payment to engage in efficient self-help or mit-
igation efforts (such as staying out of the rolling boulders’ path).33 Not
so, if Jack will have to pay Jill for the damage actually caused. Although
we can assume that Jill has her own reasons for not wanting to be
crushed by a boulder (even if she—or her estate—were compensated for
it), it is not implausible that she would be at least marginally less careful
about keeping her personal property out of harm’s way if payments were
based on realized harm.34
One disadvantage of paying for an input in advance is that it leaves any
luck-based risk to fall on the victim. If random factors determine whether
a given boulder rolls in a straight (and hence avoidable) path or instead ca-
reens crazily through Jill’s property, and if we assume that Jill is less able
to insure against risk than is Jack, then making Jack liable for the actual
harm may have advantages. Improving Jill’s access to insurance would be
another alternative, of course. To the extent we can identify the factors
that influence outcomes and isolate their impacts—perhaps boulders roll
crazily in snowy or muddy conditions but in a predictable path when the
ground is dry—the risk associated with the occurrence of those factors can
be alienated to some third party who is well positioned to bear it. Pre-
cisely such slicing and dicing of risks can be seen in innovations like
weather derivatives—financial instruments that pay off only if certain
weather conditions obtain, permitting weather-sensitive businesses to
hedge against bad weather luck.35
Another problem with prepaying for inputs involves Jack’s future in-
centives to make use of innovative new technologies to reduce harm. Hav-
ing already prepaid to roll boulders, Jack might not seem to have any
reason to employ a newly invented boulder-removal machine that would
cost less to buy and operate than the expected value of the harm to Jill.
The dissenting judge in Boomer v. Atlantic Cement made precisely such
an argument against allowing a factory to proceed with its operations upon
payment of a preset amount in “permanent damages” to neighbors
harmed by those operations.36 Making payment for inputs iterative (rather
than once and for all) offers a solution, but one that may be administra-
tively cumbersome. Alternatively, we might devise mechanisms whereby
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Jill can buy back Jack’s boulder-rolling privileges in accordance with spec-
ified protocols at some point in the future. We would expect Jack to give
up his boulder-rolling privileges if Jill offered him enough money to pur-
chase the boulder-removal machine and still come out ahead, but negoti-
ations may be difficult. Giving Jill the right to require Jack to adopt new
externality-reducing technologies, provided she pays for them, could offer
a more streamlined solution.
Pricing and Property’s Function
It is helpful at this point to step back and examine how the notion
of pricing inputs connects to the functional understanding of property in-
troduced earlier. If property is understood as a reservoir for containing in-
puts and their outcomes, enforcement of property boundaries represents
only one way of accomplishing the containment function. There are a
number of other possibilities. First, activities that have a propensity to gen-
erate too many harmful outcomes can simply be banned. For example, the
law might forbid the Jacks of the world from heaving boulders across the
landscape. Alternatively, prohibitions could be stated in terms of out-
comes—Jack could be forbidden to roll boulders that cross within ten feet
of Jill’s dwelling—with supercompensatory penalties attached to viola-
tions. It would also be possible to charge harmful outcomes back to the
actor whose actions produced those outcomes. Here, Jack could com-
pensate Jill for the harm she suffered as a result of his boulder-rolling ac-
tivities. Finally, inputs that produce a risk of harmful outcomes for others
might be priced, as discussed above.
Although remedies for nuisance have included damages as well as in-
junctive relief, spillovers have primarily been managed through prohibi-
tions on particular land uses. Because nuisance covers only a limited
spectrum of impacts, zoning or covenants are typically at issue when
homeowners attempt to expand the envelope of control beyond their in-
dividual parcels. These land use controls tend to rely on bans that can be
enforced injunctively. As the volume and extent of these input-based pro-
hibitions grows, almost unbearable pressure is placed on the understand-
ing of ownership as a realm of relative autonomy. The relief valves that
exist tend to be political in nature.
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Explicitly pricing inputs may offer a better way to reconcile the prerogatives
of land ownership with the realities of community interdependence. Where
a multitude of activities undertaken on property are central to a landowner’s
own legitimate ends and at the same time potentially detrimental to the le-
gitimate ends of neighboring landowners, blunt categorical bans fall short—
they either underprotect owners or overregulate them. More nuanced
solutions are possible through pricing mechanisms. In Parts II and III, I flesh
out how such mechanisms could operate to resolve two distinct sets of con-
flicts in neighborhoods that are schematically represented in Figure 1-1.
The letter A in Figure 1-1 represents a single residential parcel of land.
As the next chapter discusses in more detail, Parcel A is a porous resource
that both impacts and is impacted by its neighbors. Zoning or covenants
might be employed to establish a larger envelope of control, represented
by the oval labeled B. This outward expansion of control indeed helps to
address the problem of spillovers, but it can generate problems of its own.
Difficult trade-offs must be made between the rights vouchsafed to the
community falling within the expanded area of control and those left with
individual parcel-holders. The sorts of relatively inalienable, categorical
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Figure 1-1. The expanding envelope
rules that are most often used to govern realm B may not work espe-
cially well at striking that balance. Moreover, even if all of the interests
within B could be perfectly addressed through a governance regime that
shifted an optimal amount of control to the community, the policies en-
acted by B might create inefficiencies within the larger community of
which B is a subset, represented by the larger oval labeled C in Figure 
1-1.37 In Parts II and III, respectively, I explore mechanisms that can be
used in conjunction with the traditional homeownership paradigm to
address these two sets of problems.
Part IV, in contrast, challenges the traditional homeownership para-
digm directly. Increasingly refined mechanisms for pricing inputs into
common environments can make headway in reducing the divergence
between the choices made by homeowners and the impacts that the
homeowner suffers or enjoys. However, not all inputs into home price
volatility can be captured through such mechanisms, and not all inputs
that can be captured in this manner are most efficiently managed by in-
dividual homeowners. Rather than focus on ways to extend control to
match exposure, the final part of the book considers ways to scale back
the homeowner’s exposure so that it aligns more closely with the home-
owner’s effective sphere of control. In other words, I examine whether
the home should be turned into a less porous entity, at least as far as in-
vestment risk is concerned, through institutional mechanisms that ab-
sorb some of the shocks to home values.
To set the stage for the analysis that follows in Parts II, III, and IV,
two additional pieces of groundwork are necessary. The next chapter dis-
cusses more concretely the unbounded nature of residential property in
metropolitan areas. Doing so requires considering the many components
of the home that go beyond its physical structure. Although I refer to the
whole as a “bundle” and the home purchase as a “bundled” one, I do so
not to invoke the bundle-of-rights or bundle-of-sticks metaphor for prop-
erty, but rather to draw attention to the elements that constitute the home
as a resource and that account for its value. Many of these elements are
shaped by the choices that other actors, whether neighboring homeown-
ers or local governments, make. Chapter 3 concludes this part with a game-
theoretic discussion of the dilemmas arising from those interdependent
decisions, which are more fully explored in Parts II and III.
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MANAGING THE NEIGHBORHOOD COMMONS
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In any community, control over resources must be divided some-
how between the individual members and the group as a whole. This holds
true even in the smallest of communities, the household, as Robert El-
lickson’s work has shown.1 Although household members may share many
resources, specific individuals typically have proprietary control over pri-
vatized areas, such as particular bedrooms. Even within these spaces, how-
ever, the household’s “management” has veto rights over activities that
produce spillovers. Thus, a child may correctly assert that a particular bed-
room is “his,” even though he lacks the authority to set a fire within it, to
crank the stereo to an earsplitting level, or to admit unapproved guests
through its windows.
Similarly, land use rights must be divided up between households (who
own particular parcels of land) and the community that those households
constitute. Property law must respond to the fact that the neighborhood
environment experienced by each homeowner—an integral part of his
housing bundle—is deeply influenced by the acts of nearby property own-
ers. The previous chapter framed the problem by explaining that goods
such as local ambience that are shared among neighbors can be under-
stood as common-pool resources. Scores of commonplace residential ac-
tivities—lawn maintenance, rubbish control, yard art, external painting,
on-site car repairs, and pet keeping, to name just a few—can constitute
draws against, or investments in, the neighborhood commons.2 Moreover,
absent some constraint, owners might shift residential parcels into more in-
tensive and lucrative uses that would have pronounced effects on the local
environment.
Public land use regulation (zoning) and private land use regulation
(covenants) both attempt to manage the common resource of the local
environment. These two approaches line up with the two dominant ap-
proaches that are usually prescribed for resolving commons dilemmas—
governmental regulation (or “Leviathan”) and private property.3 At
another level, each can be understood as a version of the group-initiated
arrangements that have often emerged within limited-access commons.
Both sorts of land use controls are premised on the idea that property
owners can be made better off as a group if each of them cedes some prop-
erty rights to the community. While each owner gives up something in the
process, he gains something that is at least potentially more valuable—his
neighbors’ reciprocal concessions. Although land use controls can be quite
effective in shutting down certain kinds of resource dilemmas, these de-
vices can introduce problems of their own. One set of concerns—the ef-
fects that controls have on who locates within a given community—will be
deferred to Part III. Here, I focus not on such “membership effects” but
rather on what we might call “compliance effects”—the impacts of land
use controls on what people do while living within the community.4
Ideally, we want households to be constrained from engaging in be-
havior on their property when, but only when, that behavior generates net
social costs. Because both public and private land use controls operate pri-
marily by banning inputs outright, they are relatively insensitive to differ-
ences in the balance of costs and benefits within categories of uses. While
both types of land use controls contain political interfaces for toggling be-
tween permission and prohibition, neither offers a pricing mechanism or
a bargaining platform capable of facilitating market interactions. The re-
sult is that prohibitions may inefficiently block behavior that would pro-
duce net social gains. Yet, lifting a prohibition across the board, even if
politically possible, may produce net social losses. In other words, land use
controls generally present communities with binary choices, and neither
choice may produce efficient results. What is needed are mechanisms that
will facilitate efficient bargains while protecting the parties against un-
wanted draws on the neighborhood environment.
In this chapter, I consider in a general way how traditional land use con-
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Part II considered the interhousehold difficulties that can arise
within a given jurisdiction or neighborhood and explored how entitle-
ments might be designed to address those problems. If we zoom out from
this highly localized view to examine an entire metropolitan area, we see
similarly structured strategic dilemmas playing out between communities.
Although interjurisdictional conflicts can arise over a variety of issues, the
most challenging and controversial of these involve the inclusion and ex-
clusion of residents. In this part, I suggest that associational patterns can
amount to resource dilemmas that might be usefully addressed with the
theoretical tools of property.
Compliance Effects and Membership Effects
Homeowners view their neighbors as extremely important inputs
into their property values and residential consumption experiences. Ac-
cordingly, land use restrictions targeting the characteristics and behaviors
of residents are ubiquitous. Although land use controls with associational
purposes or effects are often discussed under the rubric of “exclusionary
zoning,” that label can be confusing; it means different things to different
people, often carries an emotional charge, and applies by its terms only to
public land use controls. Instead, I want to distinguish between two fun-
damental ways that land use controls impact communities. First, land use
controls can directly alter the actions of those people who would live in the
community whether or not the controls existed (“compliance effects”).
Obviously, compliance with behavioral rules falls within this category, but
so too does a household’s choice to purchase and pay property taxes on a
house that meets local zoning standards (rather than some other home
that it might have purchased in the absence of those standards). Second,
land use controls can impact the community’s membership by actually
changing who lives there, in terms of numbers, characteristics, or both
(“membership effects”).1 The same land use control can produce both
sorts of impacts, and both effects are likely to be well represented within
any overall scheme of public or private land regulation.
Part II focused primarily on the compliance effects of land use controls.
As explored there, rules that limit choices within a community can avoid
localized tragedies, but can also produce new inefficiencies. While sorting
(a membership effect) was discussed as a potential response to these inef-
ficiencies, its limitations required us to consider other ways to reduce the
costs of compliance effects, such as through entitlement design. In this
part, I shift my focus to the membership effects of land use controls. As
we will see, controls can have membership effects even if no conscious in-
tent to exclude is present. Moreover, these effects can involve not only
keeping people out of the community but also attracting people to the
community. Overt efforts by governments or private neighborhood asso-
ciations to fence out unwanted residents thus account for only a subset of
the membership effects of land use controls.
In Chapter 2, I surveyed some of the motivations for land use controls:
apportioning property tax burdens among residents (“collecting”); con-
trolling the behavior of people who choose to live in the neighborhood
(“controlling”); facilitating the sorting of people into like-minded com-
munities by providing information about local rules (“sorting”); and keep-
ing people with particular characteristics, such as low incomes or wealth
levels, from moving in (“screening”). While screening consciously involves
membership effects, such effects can also be a by-product of measures that
are primarily concerned with collecting or controlling. For example, a zon-
ing restriction that is entirely premised on fiscal considerations will keep
out families who cannot afford the “cover charge” of purchasing a partic-
ular sort of home just as surely as would a zoning restriction animated by
outright snobbery. In addition, land use controls that appear to encour-
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A few blocks from my home in Chicago stands the Original Rain-
bow Cone, an ice cream parlor in its eighty-third year that is famous
among locals for its quirky namesake treat—five colorful flavors piled atop
a single cone. Unsurprisingly, when I go there for ice cream, I am not re-
quired to buy an ownership stake in the business. My limited ownership
bundle in the cone itself comes with some risks that are primarily under my
control—melting mishaps or ice cream headaches—but the larger risks of
running the enterprise are wisely left to Rainbow Cone’s owners. Much as
I hope Rainbow Cone survives for many decades to come, I am not forced
to place a monetary bet on that result in order to enjoy its products.
When I bought my house, however, I had to make just such a bet on the
continuing viability of charming local businesses like Rainbow Cone, as
well as on innumerable other factors—local housing trends, employment
markets, regional growth patterns, larger economic forces affecting lend-
ing practices and interest rates, government decisions about highways,
schools, land use, and public transit, and so on—all of which are likely to
influence the resale price of my home. These gambles were unavoidable if
I wanted to enjoy the consumption benefits of homeownership—which,
as I explain below, differ in degree and kind from those of renting. As An-
drew Caplin and his coauthors put it, “The current market does not allow
a household to separate its housing investment decision from its housing
consumption decision.”1 To be sure, the expected value of the investment
will be positive over time, but the variance in outcomes is high. More to
the point, it is unclear why I should be forced to gamble on factors lying
wholly outside my control in order to consume homeownership, any more
than I should be forced to invest in Rainbow Cone in order to consume
ice cream. The mandatory investment component of homeownership has
real consequences: households that lack the financial wherewithal or risk
tolerance to bet on their local housing markets simply cannot become
homeowners.
That current legal arrangements require homeowners to gamble on mat-
ters far beyond their sphere of influence and expertise is, on reflection, rather
remarkable. Homeownership is widely viewed as one of the most important
stabilizing forces in society, but it comes packaged with an enormous dose
of investment risk that homeowners are almost entirely powerless to insure
against or diversify away.2 Homeowners typically have no other asset, aside
from their own human capital, that makes up a larger share of their portfo-
lios.3 Thus, households routinely plow a hefty chunk of their wealth into
what amounts to stock in a single, risky enterprise—the neighborhood hous-
ing market.4 Placing all of the household’s eggs in one basket not only runs
counter to basic principles of portfolio diversification but also motivates bas-
ket-guarding behaviors that can have high social costs.5 Those behaviors and
their costs have been a primary focus of this book.
I have emphasized from the start that many of the factors that give the
modern residence its value are located beyond the property’s boundaries. We
have seen how the tools households and communities employ to control
those factors can misfire, creating new tragedies. We can now see how the
very manner in which homeownership is configured contributes to the prob-
lem that lies at the core of these dilemmas—the mismatch between a home-
owner’s exposure and her control. Parts II and III worked on this problem
from within the traditional paradigm of homeownership. There, I asked how
we might design better mechanisms for addressing spillovers at both within-
community and between-community scales, operating on the assumption
that households would remain exposed to the full measure of positive and
negative impacts. In this last part of the book, I rethink that assumption.
Even with the best available spillover-management tools in place, house-
holds may not be the parties best positioned to bear the residual risks. Ac-
cordingly, I consider here the prospects for scaling back the homeowner’s
exposure to off-site risks that she cannot efficiently bear. 
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small group might conceivably cause significant extraterritorial spillover effects that harm
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Chapter Two. Constructing the Home
1. The elements bundled together in the home purchase, although variously delin-
eated, have been well noted in the literature. See, e.g., Rose-Ackerman, “Beyond
Tiebout,” 74; Jackson, “Public Needs,” 6; Walters, Noise and Prices, 29; Pozdena, Mod-
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7. Figure 2-2 was inspired by a similar figure in R. Ellickson, “Property in Land,”
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property ownership regimes. Ibid., 1325, fig. 2. See also Buchanan and Flowers, Public
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62. For an overlapping but somewhat broader use of the term “neighborhood com-
mons,” see Karkkainen, “Zoning,” 25–26.
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2. See Karkkainen, “Zoning,” 26. Whether something counts as a “draw” against
ambience depends, of course, on societal judgments, which are mutable. See Mahoney,
“Perpetual Restrictions,” 759–63; cf. Bruegmann, “Urban Density,” 177.
3. See Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 8–13. Ostrom critiques this dichotomous
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into either model.  See ibid., 13–23.
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between “direct effects” of zoning and “effects via mobility”); my Chapter 6 (elabo-
rating on the distinction between compliance effects and membership effects).
5. Nelson, Zoning and Property Rights, 15–18.
6. See, e.g., Dana, “Land Use Regulation,” 1286–99; Rose, “Planning and Deal-
ing.”
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8. See, e.g., Nelson, Zoning and Property Rights, 22–83; Ellickson and Been, Land
Use Controls, 74–76.
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promise and growing relevance in an environmentally challenged society, performance
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mulative zoning, an R-1 zone might permit single-family homes on lots of at least a
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12. See, e.g., Ellickson and Been, Land Use Controls, 92–94.
13. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987); Dolan v. City of
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14. Fennell, “Hard Bargains and Real Steals.” During my tenure as associate coun-
sel at the State and Local Legal Center, I worked on an amicus brief that was filed in
Dolan v. City of Tigard on behalf of the National Association of Counties et al.—a fact
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inducing valuations is merely to spread burdens fairly, rather than to internalize exter-
nalities. For analysis of how relating the tax rate to the probability that property will
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man, “Accurate Valuation.”
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2 (explaining that “[d]evelopers creating associations increasingly are responding to
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diluting the “market-driven rationale”).
Chapter Six. Association and Exclusion 
1. See Pogodzinski and Sass, “Economic Theory of Zoning,” 295 (similarly distin-
guishing “direct” effects of land use controls from those effects that are produced by
mobility). 
2. Strahilevitz, “Exclusionary Amenities” (analyzing amenity choice as an exclu-
sionary mechanism); ibid., 464–76 (examining the golf example).
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5. Cf. Cook and Ludwig, “Assigning Deviant Youths,” 29–31 (distinguishing “sys-
tem-level” studies from “mover” studies that look only at the impact of a grouping
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6. The example is not a fanciful one: many common interest communities limit ex-
terior paint colors, and some municipalities, such as Coral Gables, Florida, do so as
well. See City of Coral Gables, “So You Want to Paint Your House.”
7. See, e.g., Schwab and Zampelli, “Disentangling the Demand Function,” 246–
47; cf. Réaume, “Rights to Public Goods,” 15 (discussing goods, such as culture, that
“unite production and consumption”).
8. See Oates, “Population Flows,” 205 (noting that “characteristics of the individ-
uals of the community are themselves a critical determinant of the level of local serv-
ices”); Manski, “Educational Choice,” 356 (addressing the role of student interactions
in the production of education); Schwab and Oates, “Community Composition,” 218
(referencing studies that support the idea “that the level of attainment in a school sys-
tem or the level of safety in a neighborhood depends not so much on the instructional
staff or frequency of police patrols as on the characteristics of the residents of the ju-
risdiction”); Schwab and Zampelli, “Disentangling the Demand Function,” 254 (not-
ing the role of the income level of residents in the demand and supply of public safety).
9. See, e.g., Chubb and Moe, America’s Schools, 119 (“Researchers have found that
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55. The argument that localities should internalize the effects of their exclusion is
interestingly explored in Schragger, “Paying for Our Localism.” For discussion and
citations on the competitive use of exclusion, see Fennell, “Exclusion’s Attraction.”
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can also be pursued through intrajurisdictional zoning choices. See, e.g., Ford,
“Boundaries of Race,” 1854.
56. For analysis of the implications of these sorts of assemblies, see, e.g., Peñalver,
“Property as Entrance,” 1940–44; Hills, “Constitutional Rights of Private Govern-
ments,” 218–29; Stolzenberg, “He Drew a Circle That Shut Me Out,” 588–98.
57. Strahilevitz, “Rights to Exclude,” 1850–53.
58. On the many motives behind exclusion, see, e.g., Dietderich, “Egalitarian’s Mar-
ket,” 31; Bogart, “Big Teeth,” 1671–72; Oates, “On Local Finance,” 96; Hansmann,
“Theory of Status Organizations,” 119.
59. Under the federal Fair Housing Act, as under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, discrimination can be established through disparate impact analysis without
the need to show discriminatory intent. See, e.g., Huntington Branch NAACP v. Town
of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 933–41 (2d Cir 1988), aff’d 488 U.S. 15 (1988) (per cu-
riam). However, it is relatively difficult for plaintiffs to prevail under this standard, and
it has produced limited results. See generally Selmi, “Was the Disparate Impact The-
ory a Mistake?”
60. See Selmi, “Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?” 767–82 (suggesting
that the disparate impact theory of discrimination may have been counterproductive
to the extent that it impeded the development of a more robust understanding of in-
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Chapter Eight. Breaking Up the Bundle
1. Caplin et al., Housing Partnerships, 80.
2. See, e.g., Fischel, Homevoter Hypothesis, 9–10, 268; Shiller, Macro Markets, 78.
3. See, e.g., Fischel, Homevoter Hypothesis, 4; Bucks, Kennickell, and Moore, “Re-
cent Changes.” On human capital, see R. Ellickson, “Property in Land,” 1353.
4. See, e.g., Fischel, “Why Are There NIMBYs?” 146 (likening a home purchase to
the investment of nearly all one’s assets in “a single firm that produce[s] one product
in a single location”).
5. See, e.g., ibid.
6. As a result of excesses in lending practices in recent years, millions of U.S. home-
owners have mortgages that they cannot afford to repay; with refinancing out of reach
due to declining home values, and loan restructuring inhibited by securitization, de-
fault rates have skyrocketed. Research firm Moody’s Economy.com projects that mort-
gage foreclosures could reach 7.3 million between 2008 and 2010, with as many as 4.3
million American homeowners losing their homes. Crittenden and Holzer, “Relief
Nears.” Governmental efforts to respond to the housing crisis are ongoing as of this
writing. See, e.g., Phillips and Simon, “Mortgage Bailout.”
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